Toward a Theory of Loosely Coupled Systems: The Implementation of Federal Youth Employment Policies

Elizabeth Anne VanderPutten

CHAPTER I

STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS, OUTPUTS AND SLIPPAGE

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Overview

The concept of slippage is introduced in this chapter specifically as it refers to federally supported work and education programs. Slippage in such programs, it is suggested, can be measured as the difference between the service output levels that are promised by a project in its contract with the federal government and those that are delivered by the staff of the contracting social service agency.

More important, this chapter seeks to explain slippage, in part, by the subgoals of the staff who deliver the services. Subgoals are defined as attainable, short-term objectives that guide the behaviors of persons where there are no secure means of linking actions to higher-level goals. The hypothesis that subgoals influence action is based on work by Herbert A. Simon.4-1 A brief review of relevant research is presented, which points to the appropriateness of focusing on the staff who deliver services in seeking to explain slippage in ways to be amenable to policy influence.

Reasons are offered for focusing on federally supported youth employment policies in a study of the relationships between subgoals and slippage. This chapter also contains a discussion of the data to be used; procedures, limitations and strengths of the methodology; and some implications of this work.

2. Slippage: A Definition

Social scientists often distinguish outputs from outcomes. In broad terms, slippage is the difference between what policy-makers want and what actually happens. These wants are sometimes expressed as outcomes. At other times, they focus on outputs. Often they specify both.

Outcomes are the consequences of actions. Increased educational achievement levels of poor or minority students is one of the expected outcomes of many federal education policies. Outputs are the means by which the desired outcomes are to be achieved. Often they are the services to be provided or a specific technology to be used.

While outcomes and outputs are related, just as ends and means are related, they are often separated. One result is that the achievement of one may not be preceded or succeeded by the other. The adoption of a given technology, for example, may not lead to higher scores on achievement tests. Conversely, a desired outcome may be attained by means of outputs that were, in whole or in part, unrelated to policy intent.

One study, for example, reviewed 140 cases of technological innovation in state and local governments. It found that those factors leading to the incorporation of the technology (e.g., chief executive support, location of innovation, timely delivery of funds) are different from those leading to desired outcomes. The study also found that unless the needs of the staff were considered, they would simply not efficiently implement the new procedures.6-1

Slippage can be defined as the difference between policy intent and (1) outcomes (i.e., benefits accrued by intended clients or recipients), or (2) outputs (i.e., the services intended to be delivered). This study uses the second definition. The basic reason is that service providers are generally held accountable for delivering specific services or other outputs, and not for broad outcomes.

3. Basic Questions

At all levels, policy-makers, who are concerned with the problems of slippage, face three basic questions:

1. What are the determinants of policy outputs?
2. What are the relationships between staff behaviors and policy outputs?
3. In what ways can the actions of staff members be influenced so as to increase congruence between what policy- makers want and the outputs they obtain?

Even the most laissez-faire policy-maker or administrator assumes that there will be some connection between his or her decisions and outputs. To do otherwise would be for the higher-level official to assume that he or she was at best superfluous in the organization.

In some organizations, managers have considerable influence over outputs. A factory foreman, for example, or an office manager can observe and often measure the actions of staff. Tasks can be specific and deadlines set. Staff who do not comply with orders can be fired.

Nevertheless, even in these organizations, staff do not always do as they are told; outputs do not always follow policy. Several studies of businesses, for example, found that the adoption of an office technology is more than simply purchasing equipment. Unless staff accept the technologies, are comfortable in their use, and do not feel threatened, they will generally resist change. Failure to consider the concerns of staff members can result in unnecessary or wasted expenditures.7-1

Slippage, in terms of outputs, seems to be particularly widespread in organizations characterized as "loosely coupled."7-2 In such organizations, goals are often unclear and sometimes conflicting, the ability of managers to control staff behaviors is restricted, staff are often unsupervised, and the means of evaluating them are limited. Schools and other social service agencies are generally typed as loosely coupled.7-3

B. THE SLIPPAGE PROBLEM IN THE FEDERAL CONTEXT

1. Variation in Policy Intent

During the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government initiated a wide range of policies and programs aimed at improving the political, economic, and social conditions of the poor, handicapped, women and minorities.8-1 These outcomes were to be achieved partly as a result of various outputs.

The Brown decision, in 1954, and subsequent court orders, sought to reduce some of the inequities in society by ending de jure segregation. Among the expected outputs were equal educational services for all students.

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 19658-2 authorized funds to increase expenditures for certain economically and educationally disadvantaged children. School districts, states and the federal government were to provide compensatory services where needed, and to carry out evaluations of the programs. The Education of All Handicapped Persons Act of 1975, for example, required schools to provide individualized education plans for handicapped children, and to educate them in the "least restrictive environment" suitable for their needs.8-3

The point here is simply to document the case that a wide range of outputs (remedial instruction, program evaluations, individualized programs) were specified.

2. Slippage in Outputs and Outcomes

Twenty years of social program evaluation indicate that, while much was accomplished under federal leadership and with federal funds, there remains a marked lack of congruity between the hopes of federal education policy-makers and outcomes attained. For example, while the educational achievement levels of disadvantaged children improved, they still score, on the average, well below that of their more advantaged counterparts.9-1 At the same time, income and race remain fairly valid predictors of both academic failure and of unemployment, as well as of crime and other antisocial behaviors.9-2

Of more immediate concern here, however, several of these evaluations also show that there is considerable slippage between policy intent and outputs. A study of the implementation of state-administered, federally supported educational innovation projects reported, for example, that "the same innovation typically was implemented differently in different school districts, in different schools within the same district, and even within the same school."9-3 While variation by itself does not necessarily mean that slippage had occurred, the variation does suggest that some slippage probably took place. The variation, moreover, indicates that actual services delivered depended, in part at least, on the staff of the schools and districts.

The National Science Foundation (NSF) conducted a 4-year study of its attempts to improve the curricula in science, mathematics and social science across the country. The study reported that the basic structure-the scope and sequence -- of these courses had changed little between 1955 and 1975 (the two principal decades of NSF activity), and, moreover, that less than 15 percent of the teachers in the country had ever used the materials developed with NSF grants.10-1 A major study of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) found that variation was the norm in the implementation of those programs. It concluded that there was no such thing as one "Title I program, but rather 16,000 Title I programs" (i.e., one for each school district in the country).10-2 It is not surprising that the study's director stated that, "although the federal government can influence the action of state and local governments, it cannot fully control them" original emphasis.10-3

3. Dilemmas

Faced with the growing recognition that several major policies were not producing the desired results, federal policy-makers attempted various means to reduce slippage. In doing so, however, they faced a complex set of dilemmas. On the one hand, Congress wished to ensure that the funds it authorized were spent in the intended manner; on the other hand, Congress wished to avoid offending states and localities with overly restrictive regulations that might get it embroiled in undesirable political disputes. Again, the federal government wished to hold recipients accountable for the "proper" use of federal funds (i.e. the provision of approved services), while, at the same time, it wished to allow the states adequate flexibility in implementing programs so that intended outcomes would result.

In general, Congress reacted to the slippage phenomenon in two somewhat contradictory ways. One was to increase the specificity of regulations. The other was to give funds to the states with minimal specifications in terms of outputs or outcomes. It may be fair to note that neither approach fully resolved the dilemmas seemingly inherent in slippage.

a. Increased regulation

In broad terms, federal regulations can be categorized as (1) those aimed at ensuring federal funds are spent on specific clients, that is, targeting; (2) those intended to influence the types of services offered to clients, that is, outputs; and (3) those designed to achieve long-range goals or outcomes. In part because of their specificity and the consequent ability of the federal government to hold recipients accountable, and, in part, because of growing concern about slippage, Congress during the 1970s focused increased attention on targeting.

There are various procedures used to target funds. "Income qualification tests" are intended to ensure that only members of certain income groups receive services.11-1 "Set-aside provisions" require that funds be specifically earmarked for certain purposes or groups.12-1 "Maintenance of effort" requirements are designed to ensure that states and localities continue to spend their own funds at the same level they did before receiving federal funds.12-2 "Comparability" requirements are aimed at ensuring that districts spend as much local funds on schools receiving federal monies as they spend on other schools.12-3

In general, studies found that these provisions have strong effects on state, district and school behaviors. For example, studies of Title I of ESEA reveal that few ineligible students get aid.12-4 Other studies show that, where federal programs require specific targeting of funds, state and local government agencies are likely to comply.12-5

Federal attempts to influence the types of services offered have had mixed results. While the government rarely attempted to define the exact services to be offered, it often sought to determine the procedures by which such services were selected. The mechanisms included regulations such as requirements for (1) increased coordination among social service agencies,13-1 (2) detailed planning processes,13-2 (3) involving parents13-3, and 13-4 (4) appointing coordinators responsible for sex or racial equity. Evaluations show generally that, after the rules are known, state and local officials comply. At the same time, studies often found little relationship between technical compliance and actual outputs. A study of the planning involved in vocational education, for example, reported that:

The 15 case study states were unanimous in their belief that the primary purpose for the preparation of State plans was to serve as a basis for measuring compliance ... As a result, the planning documents produced are rarely used at the State level. States speak of the "real" plan, which usually is a detailed set of operating procedures, sometimes written down in a single document, sometimes not, and the "compliance" one which is sent to Washington and not referred to thereafter. Nor are the full annual plans used much at the local level.13-5

In reviewing the effects of these plans, the House Committee on Education and Labor concluded:

It seems that what is occurring now is that the Office of Education is demanding a great deal of paperwork and detailed data from the States and local school districts but then there is no follow-up... In other words, a blind concentration on seeking compliance on paper with the process has led to a total neglect of trying to seek the results the process was created to achieve.14-1

A study of the Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act's requirement that at least twenty-two percent of the funds be set aside for in- school youth, for example, reported that the provision "set in motion the forces necessary for genuine collaboration between the education system and the employment and training establishment."14-2 The study found, however, that financial incentives alone were not sufficient to bring about substantive change within either institution.

The various mechanisms adopted to ensure that outputs conform with federal intent not only do not always work, but they frequently engender local hostility as well. In fact, as early as the late-1960s, the cumulative effect of federal regulations was recognized as a problem, and, by the late 1970s, such cumulative effects were perceived to be of major proportions. As Samuel Halperin, a prime mover behind much federal education policy during the Kennedy-Johnson era, admitted a few years ago, "The weight of federal guidelines and regulations may soon outweigh the beneficial impact of relatively meager federal funds."14-3

b. The "no-strings attached" approach

Another approach, that of turning federal funds over to state and local governments with minimal regulations, has also proved not to be satisfactory, at least from the viewpoint of ensuring that certain services are offered. One argument for delegation of federal authority is that state and local governments are closer to the problems and more apt to know what needs to be done. Revenue sharing, for example, provides funds to states to be used within several broad categories as the states determine to be most useful.15-1

If the goal of a federal policy is to provide general-purpose funds to other levels of governments, the "no-strings attached" approach works. If the purpose, however, is to ensure that federal funds supplement local monies, or that particular services are provided, the approach does not work well.15-2

4. Slippage: A Continuing Issue

There is no imperative that federal social policies aim at particular outputs or outcomes. Within certain political constraints, it is possible for the government to determine its policies on purely political grounds, or to support a position based on national security or economic needs or any one or combination of purposes. It may decide that the only purpose is to give funds to states to be used for whatever purpose they choose.

To the extent, however, that specific results are desired, slippage will be an issue. Where existing regulatory measures have not been successful in ensuring compliance or avoiding local opposition, other policies and mechanisms are needed.

C. AN OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH
ON SLIPPAGE IN FEDERAL SOCIAL PROGRAMS

1. Introduction

Research has done much to explain why federal social service programs have had limited effects on the characteristics of services offered at the local level. Slippage has been shown to occur at all levels in the federal social policy development and implementation chain. Generally, it is seen as undesirable. Frequently it is taken as a sign of inefficiency and wastefulness.

Research suggests that slippage in federal social policies is a function of multiple factors, no one of which alone is totally responsible. Among these are the law-making process and the often resulting vagueness of goals and means, the loosely coupled nature of the federal system and the federal policy implementation chain, and the street-level bureaucrats who ultimately are responsible for providing the service outputs at which policies are directed. Increasingly, research points to the local level as a potentially fruitful area of interest, particularly because it is there that service outputs are produced, and because the local level may be susceptible to federal policy influence. Ultimately, many analysts suggest, federal social policy outputs are a matter of local commitment. What research has not done well is to develop theories that explain the nature of local commitment and the mechanisms by which it operates.

2. Research on Slippage in the
Policy-Making and Policy-Administration Processes

Some early research showed that a considerable degree of slippage could be explained by the law-making and administration processes. Work by Bailey,17-1 for example, investigated the processes by which a social policy bill became a law, and documented the tradeoffs involved that resulted in vague and ambiguous statements of intent. Such statements could clearly account for much of the discrepancy between intent and the results obtained.  

Succeeding work by Bailey and Mosher,17-2 among others, examined the processes by which a social service law is translated into programmatic terms of goals and objective, rules, regulations, and guidelines. Because of the law's vagueness, which permitted varying interpretations, and because Administration officials frequently had different agendas than those of law-makers, members of administrative agencies had a good deal of freedom in interpreting the law and deciding on its administration.

This line of research indicated that the existence of vaguely worded laws, coupled with different understandings and motivations on the Administration side and the relative independence of Administration officials from congressional control, could permit considerable alteration in the intent of the law. Slippage could therefore be explained, in part, by the nature of the federal system and by the differing agendas of important actors in the law making and administration processes.

3. Loosely Coupled Systems and Street-Level Bureaucrats

Organizational theories, according to researchers such as March and Simon,18-1 can be divided among three groups: (1) those that assume that members are essentially passive units,18-2 (2) those that assume members are basically reluctant participants,18-3 and (3) those that assume that members are fundamentally decision-makers.18-4 Each type of theory implies a different type of organization, different assumptions about and explanations of member behavior, and different analyses of slippage.

Organizations where members are decision-makers are often called "loosely coupled." Members at any given level are largely immune from control by members at any other level.18-5 The federal system and social service agencies are typically classified as loosely coupled.

Slippage in federal social policies can then be explained, partially at least, in terms of the relatively autonomous nature of members at different levels. The loosely coupled nature of the federal system may permit Administration officials to modify Congressional intent, as well as allow front-line service providers considerable discretion in decision- making to choose which services to deliver and at what level. Slippage in federal social policies can then be seen as a function of the loosely coupled nature of the system.

Recent research on slippage in federal social policies tends to focus on policy implementation at the local level and on those service providers who have come to be known as "street-level bureaucrats."19-1 These are the social workers, teachers, health care providers and others, who are responsible for the day-to-day provision of services to clients. A police- man is illustrative. It is generally recognized that there are more laws on the books of any town, city, state or national government than can be enforced by any single individual at one time. Often the laws are vague or ambiguous and sometimes even mutually contradictory. As a result, the policeman must be a daily, moment-to-moment, on-the-spot decision-maker, deciding to enforce some laws and not others.19-2

Using what is sometimes called a "mapping backward"19-3 approach, researchers have investigated the phenomenon of slippage in federal social policies by starting with the street-level bureaucrat and the local con- text. Two findings have become almost axiomatic. One is that implementation of federal policies is ultimately a matter of local commitment. The second is that local service providers, the street-level bureaucrats, are central to the federal social policy implementation process. The questions become, then, why some street-level bureaucrats are committed to policy subgoals, and how they translate this commitment into action.

 4. Individually Held Subgoals

Given the multiple, vague, ambiguous and of ten conflicting nature of federal social policies; the loosely coupled nature of the federal social service policy implementation system; and the centrality of local commitment and the role of the street-level bureaucrat, some of the basic questions are: What is the nature of "local commitment?" What is meant A. by "local?" Who are the significant "local" actors? What is the essential nature of local "commitment?" What are the mechanisms by which such commitment operates?

In loosely coupled systems, where members are decision-makers, and, according to Herbert Simon, where there are no certain ways by which a member can tie individual behaviors to long-range goals, individually held subgoals may be important.20-1 Subgoals are relatively short-term, specific, and discrete objectives, the means of achieving which are perceived by the person to be under his or her control. They can be: (1) professional, such as increasing students' reading ability; (2) organizational, such as promoting a positive image of the member's school in the community; or (3) personal, such as protecting one's job.

This line of investigation posits that individual subgoals do not derive from broad policy goals, such as increasing profit or decreasing youth unemployment. Their formulation, rather, seems to depend on the "knowledge, experience and organizational environment of the decision maker...It can also be influenced in subtle and not so subtle ways by his self interest and power drives."20-2

5. Summary

While various lines of research on the local implementation of federal social policies have been productive in explaining many of the factors involved in the disparity between policy intent and local outputs, the continued existence of slippage suggests that the remedies implied are either insufficient, or are not followed, or both. Research on the relationships between individually held subgoals and policy outputs seems to offer a promising and relatively new approach to the continued problem of slippage.

D. FEDERAL YOUTH EMPLOYMENT POLICIES

This study compares and contrasts the implementation of ten youth employment-education projects authorized by the Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA) and administered by Youthwork, Inc.

Any number of federal, or, for that matter, state or corporate, programs could have been selected for a study of the relationships among outputs, slippage and subgoals. Federal youth employment policies in general, and Youthwork projects in particular, have several advantages.

First, the problem of youth unemployment is serious and it is not open to easy technological solutions. In 1981, over 16 percent of the white youths and over 35 percent of the minority youths were unable to find jobs.21-1 The unemployment rate reflects lack of basic skills, knowledge of job availability, job experience and jobs themselves.21-2        

No one action or set of actions has proven consistently to alleviate the problem. Moreover, there is considerable debate about the nature of the problem. Is youth unemployment a problem because an unemployed youth lacks money? Has nothing meaningful to do? May turn to crime and other anti-social behavior? With ambiguous goals and lack of strong evidence that a given service will help, it is unlikely that staff will be able to make decisions about what services to offer through a process of rational decision-making. It is more likely that they will be motivated by their individually held subgoals.        

Second, the federal government has a long interest in employment policies for youth. The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 (MDTA), while primarily a retraining program for workers displaced by technology, also supported basic skills centers and the Job Corps, a residential program for poor urban and rural youths.22-1 The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) consolidated a number of programs for youths and adults while turning authority for running the programs over to prime sponsors.22-2 The Basic Educational Opportunity Grants authorized by the Higher Education Amendments of 1972 (now called the Pell Grants) gave funds to low-income youths that could be used at training schools as well as colleges and universities.22-3

The Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA) provided funds for five programs. These included the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Project (YIEPP) which was designed to test the efficacy of guaranteeing work to youth as an incentive for remaining in school. The Youth Employment and Training Program (YETP) provided funds for education and work experience for disadvantaged youths, and called for formal cooperation between CETA prime sponsors and local education agencies. The Act also continued the Job Corps and an older Summer Youth Program (SYP).

Finally, the Act gave the Secretary of Labor discretionary funds to study alternative means of providing education and employment services. The Youthwork projects were supported by these latter funds.23-1

The above litany of federal involvement in employment services is not intended to be exhaustive. It is rather intended to suggest that it is likely the federal government will continue to have some interest in supporting federal youth programs with more or less specific intended outcomes and outputs.

Third, the system that provides youth with federally supported employment-related services epitomizes the concept of "loose coupling." Federal funds flow to prime sponsors, usually through the states, and are then contracted to various local agencies, such as schools and community- based organizations. Decisions must be made at all levels. Schools and community-based organizations, as well as private sector employers, who give jobs, are subject to numerous policies and regulations and have many goals, only some, if any, of which are related to youth employment. The prime sponsor has no authority over these agencies, except insofar as they accept funds.

Fourth, the Youthwork projects provide a natural laboratory to study how different organizations implement the same policy. Youthwork -- a non-profit organization established to help the Department of Labor administer YEDPA -- gave forty-eight awards to schools, community based organizations, private employers, and CETA prime sponsors to test alternative methods of providing employment related services to youths. As is discussed in detail in Chapter III, all awardees were to offer some combination of basic skills instruction, academic credit for work experience, and job experiences. In addition, they were free to select other services to be offered. All were required to ensure that federal funds were spent only on economically disadvantaged youths.

Finally, and not of little importance, data were available for the study. As part of its "knowledge development effort," Youthwork awarded a contract to Cornell University, under the direction of Dr. Ray Rist, to conduct case studies of each site. The studies were conducted over a period of a year. Detailed field notes were kept, as were copies of relevant documents. These data were available for secondary analysis.24-1

E. RESEARCH ASSERTIONS

Because this study is exploratory and seeks to develop a model for further testing, rather than testing a developed theory, it is guided by research assertions24-2 rather than technical hypotheses. Research assertions are what might be considered "best guesses" about what is expected. The assertions that guided this study were:

1. Persons with different educational and professional backgrounds have different individual subgoals.
2. Staff members' individually held professional, organizational and personal subgoals are one of the explanations of outputs of social programs.
3. The extent to which professional subgoals influence output may be strongly limited by personal subgoals.
4. The strength of the relationship between professional subgoals and outputs is influenced by the community, scarcity of resources, and the focus of the project.
5. By considering the subgoals of the front-line service deliverer, higher-level authorities can reduce the likelihood of slippage.

F. RESEARCH PROCEDURES

While this study involves a secondary analysis of qualitative data, the procedures used are essentially similar to those used by qualitative researchers in general. These include defining the problem, reviewing the related literature, formulating hypotheses or research assertions, developing data collection instruments, collecting and analyzing the data, and drawing conclusions and recommendations.         

For the purposes of this research, slippage was limited to the difference between the levels of service outputs specified in the contract between the project and Youthwork and the actual output levels delivered. A sample of ten cases was selected from a database consisting of forty- eight Cornell University/Youthwork case studies.

Subgoal levels were determined using both open- and closed-ended questions that were asked about participants in the Youthwork ethnographic protocols. The relationships between these subgoals and outputs were analyzed in terms of three broad concepts: scarcity, community, and focus.

G. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND ADVANTAGES

Secondary analysis of qualitative, multi-site case-study material is relatively new. The related methodologies are discussed in detail in Chapter III. It should be noted here, however, that there are distinct advantages and disadvantages to such analyses. As with other types of qualitative research, statistical generalization to a larger population is not possible. Because such a study depends on data collected by other researchers, who may have been guided by somewhat different conceptual designs, certain important data may not be available.         

On the positive side, the use of existing qualitative data is cost effective, and permits a single researcher the opportunity to examine data from several sites. The closer the hypotheses or research conceptualizations guiding the studies are to each other, the more likely it is that the needed data will be available. Because of similarities in conceptual design and purpose between the Cornell University/ Youthwork studies and this one, most needed data were available.

H. RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE

1. Theory

As has been suggested and is discussed further in Chapters II and III, much has been done to demonstrate the conditions under which slip- page at the local level is likely to occur. These include vagueness of goals, loosely coupled systems, layers of decision-makers and decision points, and scarcity of resources. Relatively little is known about the mechanisms that link these factors to outputs. By examining the idea that the professional, organizational and personal subgoals of street-level bureaucrats may have a strong influence on final outputs, this study may contribute to an understanding of these mechanisms.

2. Policy

The findings of this research may be significant for policy development in several ways. This study suggests that considering the subgoals of staff might lead to greater congruence between policy intent and outputs. Staff, whose subgoals are similar to the subgoals of the policy, are more likely to deliver services that are consistent with the policy. Where personal subgoals are reasonably fulfilled, the study suggests that more attention will be paid to professional subgoals and, consequently, outputs should increase.

This study suggests that, if slippage is to be minimized, policy-makers and administrators should consider the extent to which the policy contributes to -- or detracts from -- the individually held subgoals of street-level service deliverers. The study also suggests that there is an interaction between the professional subgoals that staff bring to a project and the project's subgoals. That is, over time, the professional subgoals of staff may become modified in reaction to the project. One of the implications of the study is that care should be taken in designing policies and administrative procedures so that subgoals are reinforced.

3. Methodology

Implications of this study for methodology are in two areas. The first involves the use of secondary analysis of qualitative data and the second involves federal policies concerning social research. Secondary analysis of qualitative data is a new field. This study explores one method for such analysis. More important, perhaps, it suggests that secondary analysis in general may be an effective and efficient means of enhancing the use of qualitative data.

Given the current costs of supporting case-study research, federal and private research agencies might consider adopting requirements that encourage secondary analysis. Such procedures could be as limited as requiring that field notes be made available to other researchers, as was required by Youthwork.

I. SUMMARY

This chapter introduced the idea that slippage is a major problem for higher-level policy-makers, particularly those in loosely coupled systems. Evidence was offered that it is a serious problem for federal social policy-makers. It has suggested that the nature of social service agencies and the types of services they provide make it difficult to reduce slippage by increasing regulations. In loosely coupled systems, street-level bureaucrats have considerable discretion in implementing policies. This suggests that, since outputs are the immediate and direct results of actions by street-level bureaucrats, an analysis of the reasons that such service providers do what they do may contribute to an increased understanding of the mechanisms that lead to slippage. Individually held professional, organizational, and personal subgoals are suggested as one of the explanations of the behaviors of staff in social service agencies.         

The reasons for selecting youth employment policies for analysis in this study were discussed. More detailed analysis follows in Chapter III.

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Chapter I: Footnotes


4-1. Herbert A. Simon, "Rational Decision-Making in Business Organizations," American Economic Review 69 (September, 1979): 493-513.

6-1. Robert K. Yin, Karen A. Heald, and Mary E. Vogel, Tinkering With the System (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977).

7-1. John P. Kotter and Leonard A. Schlessinger, "Choosing Strategies for Change," Harvard Business Review 57 (March-April, 1979): 106-113.
7-2. For an often cited essay on the nature of loosely coupled systems, see Karl E. Weick, "Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (March, 1976): 1-19.
7-3. Margaret Davis, The Structure of Educational Systems: Explorations in the Theory of Loosely Coupled Organizations (Stanford: Center for Research and Development, 1977).

8-1. For a comprehensive review of the policies and laws passed during the decade, see Henry A. Levin, "A Decade of Policy Development in Improving Education and Training Programs for Low-1ncome Populations," in A Decade of Federal Anti-Poverty Policy: Achievement, Failures and Lessons, ed. Richard Haverman (New York: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 123-89.
8-2. P.L. 89-110.
8-3. For example, of the $15 billion the federal government spent on elementary and secondary education during fiscal year 1980, only $4 billion was administered directly by the federal government in Department of Defense Schools and on Indian reservations. Victor Miller, "Federal Support for Education in Fiscal Year 1980," A special analysis, prepared for the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Planning, Evaluation and Budget (Washington, D.C.: n.p., October, 1981). Mimeograph 

9-1. Condition of Education 1981 (Washington, D.C.: National Center for Educational Statistics, 1981), Chart 2.27, p. 111.
9-2. Ibid., Chart 5.14, p. 256.
9-3. Paul Berman and Milbrey Wallin McLaughlin, Federal Program Supporting Educational Change Vol. VIII: Implementing and Sustaining Innovation (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1978): p. 37.

10-1. Stanley Helgeson, Robert E. Stake, Iris Weiss, et al., The Status of Pre-College Science, Mathematics, and Social Studies Educational Practice in U.S. Schools: An Overview and Summary of Three Studies (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University and the University of Illinois, 1978).
10-2. Administration of Compensatory Education (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Education, 1977), p. v.
10-3. For a discussion of the tightening of Title I of ESEA see Michael Kirst and Richard Jung, "The Utility of a Longitudinal Approach in Assessing Implementation: A Thirteen Year View of Title I, ESEA," Education and Policy Analysis 2 (September-October, 1980): 17-34.
11-1. ESEA Title 1, the Pell Grants (The Higher Education Amendments of 1972, and the National School Lunch Act (P.L. 79-326), for example, require recipients have family incomes below a certain point.

12-1. The Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA), (P.L. 95-93) required that 22 percent of funds be spent on in-school youth pursuant to agreement with local education agencies. The Higher Education Amendments of 1976 required that 10 percent of the funds spent on teacher centers be set aside for higher education institutions.
12-2. Required by ESEA Title 1.
12-3. Required by ESEA Title 1.
12-4. For a current review of the effects of Title I see H. Carl Haywood "Compensatory Education," Peabody Journal of Education 59 (July,1982):272-300.
12-5. Mary E. Vogel, "The Distributive and Fiscal Effects of Grants Consolidation on States and School Districts," in Grants Consolidation: A New Balance in Federal Aid to Education, eds. C. Phillip Kearney and Elizabeth VanderPutten (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Educational Leadership, The George Washington University, 1980), pp. 95-112.
13-1. This was one of the stated purposes of the "twenty-two percent set-aside" of the Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act. The Vocational Education Amendments of 1976 (P.L. 94-482) and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (P.L. 93-203) required that activities funded by these programs involve at least statewide coordination.
13-2. Perhaps the most detailed planning requirements of any social service program were in the Vocational Education Amendments of 1976 (P.L. 94-482). States were required to plan according to economic conditions needs of students, and participation of women and minorities.
13-3. The Education of the Handicapped Act (P.L. 94-142) required that an individualized education plan be developed for each child in cooperation with parents and, where appropriate, other social service agencies.
13-4. The Vocational Education Amendments required that sex equity coordinators sign off on state plans.
13-5 Vocational Education Study: Final Report (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Education, 1981), IV-41.

14-1. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Education and Labor, The Vocational Education and National Institute of Education Amendments of 1976, H.R. 1085, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 4, 1976, p. 17.
14-2. Joseph Coleman and Gregory Wurzburg, Involving Schools In Employment Programs for Youth (Washington, D.C.: National Council on Employment Policy, 1979).
14-3. Samuel Halperin, "Is the Federal Government Taking Over Education?", Compact (Summer, 1976), p. 11.

15-1. Nathan, for example, argues that revenue sharing funds were used often for tax reduction rather than increased services, and benefited general purpose governments with elected officials over special service units designed to provide specific services. See, for example, Richard P. Nathan, Where Have All the Dollars Gone? (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1976), and Richard P. Nathan, The Record of the New Federalism: What It Means for the Nation.
15-2. Ibid.

17-1. Stephen K. Bailey, Congress Makes A Law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965).
17-2. Stephen K. Bailey and Edith Mosher, ESEA: The Office of Education Administers A Law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968).

18-1. This typology was developed by March and Simon. See James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley, 1958).
18-2. 1n these organizations, workers are viewed as "units" to be managed, and it is management's task to make the system run efficiently.
18-3. 1n these organizations, it is management's job to instill pride in the company in staff, to maintain morale, and to develop a sense of comradeship.
18-4. 1n these organizations, staff are sometimes independent of management efforts. Management must influence the way decisions are made.
18-5. Karl E. Weick, "Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems." Administrative Science Quarterly 21(March, 1976): 1-19.

19-1. See, for example, Michael Lipsky, "Toward a Theory of Street-Level Bureaucracy," in Theoretical Perspectives On Urban Politics, ed. Willis B. Hawley (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1976) pp. 196-213.
19-2. 1bid.
19-3. Richard F. Elmore, Complexity and Control: What Legislators and Administrators Can Do About Implementation (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Education, 1980).

20-1. Simon, "Rational Decision-Making," p. 511.
20-2. 1bid., pp. 511-512.

21-1. Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 269.
21-2. For a discussion of the general causes of youth unemployment, see Report of the Vice-President's Task Force on Youth Unemployment (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980).

22-1. P.L. 87-51.
22-2. p.L. 93-203.
22-3. p.L. 92-318, Sec. 401.

23-1. P.L. 95-93.

24-1. The procedures followed by the Cornell researchers will be discussed in detail in Chapter III. For a brief review of the methods see Ray C. Rist, "Qualitative Policy Analysis: A Case Study of an Emergent Methodology," A Paper Presented at the American Sociological Associations Annual Meeting, New York, August 30, 1980.
24-2. The use of research assertions in case study research, particularly for evaluation purposes, is rather common. For a discussion, see Jerome T. Murphy, Getting the Facts: A Fieldwork Guide for Evaluators and Policy Analysts (Santa Monica: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1980).


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