A. INTRODUCTION
This study has focused on the phenomenon of slippage in federal
social policies, that is, the differences between policy intent and
outputs, and on the roles played by the subgoals of front-line
service providers -- street-level bureaucrats -- in loosely coupled
social service agencies. The data base used was drawn from a set of
ten case studies of different local projects, all of which were
attempting to implement the same federal social service program.
The first part of the chapter relates this study to findings from
previous research. In broad terms, prior research showed that slip
page is generally viewed as a sign of inefficiency and waste and,
consequently, is undesirable, and that slippage exists at all levels
in the federal social policy development and implementation chain.
Explanations of slippage presented in these studies include (1) the
often vague, ambiguous and multiple goals of policies; (2) the loosely
coupled nature of the federal social service delivery systems; and (3)
the discretion enjoyed by local level staff and officials in
implementing policies.
Together, these studies suggested that the local site is an
appropriate focus of study, and that street—level bureaucrats are
central actors in the slippage phenomenon. The questions have focused
on why these local service deliverers choose to emphasize some
services over others. This work pursued the hypothesis that
individually held subgoals of street— level bureaucrats play an
important role in this decision—making process.
Major findings of the study are summarized in the form of four
generalizations. Because of the sampling procedures used in the study,
no claims are made that these generalizations will hold for other
populations. Rather, they are patterns that the study suggests may
hold in other situations. Areas for further research, both basic and
applied, are discussed, as are implications for policy.
B. PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND THIS STUDY
1. Previous Research Findings
For two decades, much research on federal policies has been devoted
to examining the congruity between policy intent and its results, to
documenting discrepancies between the two, and to explaining the
reasons for slippage. Early research focused on the Congressional
level, and, in the mode of many traditional political theorists, saw
slippage resulting from multiple, vague, ambiguous, and sometimes
contradictory goal statements which emerged from the political
policy-making process. Succeeding studies demonstrated that slippage
could be accounted for, in part, by the imperfect translation of
legislative intent into programmatic rules and regulations by
Executive Branch officials who either had different agendas, or who
failed to understand the policy-makers’ intent.
Other research suggested that the accountability and compliance
mechanisms embodied in policies and administrative procedures were
inadequate.
Much of this research seemed to suggest a kind of
“tightening of the reins.” At the same time, theorists and
practitioners alike pointed to the improbability that slippage could
be substantially reduced by such approaches. The electoral system, for
example, is in place; its requirements are relatively fixed; and the
law-making process seems unlikely to change greatly. The goals of
policies and laws, therefore, appear likely to remain relatively broad
and encompassing, at least in many cases. Moreover, it is unlikely
that, as long as legislative language is general, Executive Branch
officials will cease to shape and reshape policy goals.
2. Loosely Coupled Systems and Street-Level Bureaucrats
Other research focused on the local level, documented considerable
variation in the ways that policies were implemented, and sought to
explain the variation in terms of the social policy implementation
system. Organizational theorists had already shown that organizations
vary considerably in the extent to which policy-makers influence the
behaviors of those charged with carrying out authoritative decisions.
Organizations where goal-setters’ decisions are closely linked to
workers' behaviors are often classified as “tightly knit”; others,
where workers are relatively free from hierarchical control, have come
to be known as “loosely coupled” organizations.
Social service agencies generally exhibit the characteristics of
loosely coupled systems. In part because such organizations typically
have multiple, ambiguous and sometimes conflicting goals, and in part
because higher level authorities rarely exercise strong control over service providers -- teachers, social workers, CETA staff, for
example -- have considerable discretion in what services they offer.
Outputs, then, are the result, at least in the most direct sense, of
the decisions of the frontline staff. To understand slippage, it
became necessary to understand factors that influenced their
decision-making.
Some studies suggested that the explanation could be found in the
commitment of staff to the policy’s goals. The question then
becomes, what leads staff to understand and accept policy goals in
ways that contribute to the degree of congruence or slippage between
policy goals and outputs. This study explores this question.
Herbert Simon had suggested that persons, faced with ambiguous
goals and unclear means of linking actions to those goals, seek to
fulfill short- term subgoals. Subgoals are objectives that the
individual believes can be achieved by allocating resources under his
or her control. These subgoals are generally not derived from broad
policy goals, but rather from experiences, education, the community
and personal needs. This study was designed to explore Simon’s idea
as a possible explanation for the behavior of staff charged with the
implementation of federal policies.
C. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING SUBGOALS, OUTPUTS AND SLIPPAGE
Despite the exploratory nature of this research, and the limited
number of cases and individuals, data do suggest that certain patterns
are present and are likely to be found in similar situations.
Generalizations about these patterns are discussed in this section,
along with implications for both policy and future research.
This study defined professional subgoals in terms of the services offered by the projects. Organizational subgoals were defined as
the extent to which the person felt committed to his or her
organization or the project, and wished to promote its goals. Personal
subgoals were defined in terms of economic and personal security, and
in terms of a sense of accomplishment.
Generalization 1: When professional subgoals of the street-level
bureaucrats charged with implementing a policy are consistent with a
policy’s goals, the degree of slippage is likely to be lower than
where the staff’s professional subgoals are substantially at
variance with the policy’s goals,
This finding perhaps may be another way of saying that, when people
are asked to do something they already want to do, they are likely to
comply with the request, and, conversely, that, when they are asked to
do something they oppose, compliance is less likely.
The study found strong patterns between the outputs at a given site
and the relative emphasis the staff placed on various services. In
general, staff seemed to allocate most resources to the fulfillment of
professional subgoals they considered important, but less or none to
those they considered unimportant. However, where the project placed a
very high importance on a particular service, staff often delivered
more than could be predicted solely on the basis of their subgoals
These findings are consistent with the concepts of “loosely
coupled” systems and “street-level bureaucrats.” Individual
staff members are comparatively free to provide whatever levels of
client services they choose. While higher-level authorities cannot
directly influence the actions of street-level bureaucrats, they can
influence decisions by providing Incentives.
This finding does not mean that professional subgoals equal
delivery. Good will alone, or even intent, is not enough. A staff may
simply not have the resources, including time, energy, skills and cooperation
from others, to provide the types of services they value. Indeed, one
of the findings of the study was that scarcity of resources not only
has direct effects on outputs, but also has an indirect effect by
influencing staff subgoals.
Generalization 2: Where project subgoals are perceived by staff to
help them achieve strongly held professional subgoals, the level of
slippage is likely to be low even if the staff do not at first hold
subgoals similar to those of the project. Conversely, where the
project subgoals are perceived by the staff to impede the achievement
of professional subgoals, the level of slippage will increase.
From a common-sense perspective, when a person believes that one
activity will contribute to the attainment of a personally important
objective, the individual is likely to perform the activity. This
generalization is consistent with the Simon hypothesis that subgoals
can be derived from several sources, including other subgoals.
The process seems to work in two ways. One involves
instrumentality. If a project subgoal is seen as instrumental in the
achievement of a strongly held individual subgoal, then, over time,
the instrumental sub goal will become more important to the person.
Conversely, when staff views a project subgoal as detrimental to the
achievement of an important individually held subgoal, delivery will
probably drop not only for that service, but for other services as
well.
The second way this process seems to work involves complementarily
of subgoals. When two or more subgoals of roughly equal importance are
perceived by staff as mutually reinforcing, total project outputs will
probably be greater than would be predicted on the basis of the
subgoals considered individually. Allocation of time and effort to one
subgoal, rather than taking away from the achievement of other
subgoals, actually makes their achievement possible.
Some factors emerged in the study that seemed to be related to
subgoal clustering and reinforcement. When a project had a strong
focus, and it promised to deliver relatively few services at a high
level, staff seemed more likely to view project subgoals as
reinforcing to each other and to their own professional subgoals.
Where the staff had some flexibility in implementing the proposal,
and modifying it to meet the needs of clients, staff were more likely
to view the project’s subgoals as more inherently consistent and
more rein forcing of their own professional subgoals.
Generalization 3: Where participation in project activities is
perceived by the individual as contributing to -- or at least not
interfering with -- the fulfillment of personal subgoals, the
likelihood of slippage is reduced. Conversely, where participating
detracts from the fulfillment of personal subgoals -- or threatens
their attainment -- the likelihood of slippage is increased.
In this study, the subgoals of short-term economic security and
personal safety were strongly held. When they were threatened,
delivery suffered. The reasonable security and fulfillment of these
subgoals, how ever, did not guarantee high delivery, nor did their
lack of fulfillment mean that no delivery occurred.
There appear to have been three processes at work. One involved a
certain threshold of security that must be maintained or reached.
Staff cannot be continually threatened and still be expected to
produce at high levels. On the other hand, security does not seem to
guarantee high levels of delivery. A partial explanation for this
might be that a limited degree of insecurity may foster increased
efforts and, consequently, higher delivery levels. Data however are
too limited to support this conclusion or to even know that there was such a thing as a proposal.
Staff seemed to need reinforcement from the communities within
which they worked. The processes involved seemed to work in several
ways. By making it easier for staff to provide services, a
pre-existing community helped the staff feel a sense of personal
accomplishment, which, in turn, reinforced their commitment to the
project subgoals. On the other hand, where such a community did not
exist, staff had to devote large amounts of time and effort to
providing generally fewer and often lower-quality services.
Staff members also looked to their communities to determine which
services to emphasize. Where there was a good fit between community,
project and staff subgoals, output was generally high. Where the
project and community were at odds, staff was in a no-win situation.
Pleasing one group could risk alienating another. Consequently, staff
could not turn with confidence to the community for help, support, or
reinforcement of subgoals.
This study examined three factors about community that influenced
staff subgoals. These were (1) pre-existence, (2) diversity of
participants, and (3) congruence of subgoals. Of these, the effects of
the presence or absence of a pre-existing community seem best
documented. Where a pre-existing community of interests was present,
with goals and subgoals similar to the project, staff members were
likely to find reinforcement for their professional subgoals, as well
as some help in achieving personal subgoals. Where such a community
did not exist, staff had to devote considerable effort to establishing
one. This study also suggests that, where the pre-existing community
contained a variety of individuals and organizations with similar
interests, It was more likely to provide reinforcement to staff.
It should be reiterated that these interactions with the community
are, in part, the result of the particular goals of the projects
funded by the Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act and
Youthwork. In order to provide required services, project staff were
required to work with members of the community and other
organizations. It may be possible that these findings would not hold
in projects that could be self- contained in a particular
organization.
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Nature of Subgoals
As previously discussed, professional, organizational and personal
subgoals were narrowly defined in this study. While these definitions
seem to have worked reasonably well, they may not have gotten to the
essential nature of subgoals. As stated previously, the definition
specifically failed to take into account a sense of professionalism.
Moreover, because the definitions are project-specific, they would
have little meaning for staff at other sites. While this will probably
always be a problem with any definition of subgoals, given that they
are derived, in part, from the project, a broader definition is needed
if the findings of research on subgoals are to have general meaning
for policy-makers. Perhaps a taxonomy of subgoals could be developed
or more general instruments with which to measure them.
2. Sources of Subgoals
One of the research assertions guiding this study was that the
educational and experiential background of persons would influence
their professional subgoals. Unfortunately, the data proved too
limited for this kind of analysis. Ultimately, such analysis is
necessary if policy- makers and administrators are to have improved
ways of predicting how staff with different institutional backgrounds
and organizational settings may differ in their professional subgoals.
Future research designs should take the need for this analysis into
consideration.
A second and more fundamental analysis of the antecedents of
subgoals involves the relationship between values, value structures or
value hierarchies, and subgoals. How do subgoals and values differ?
How do values influence subgoals?
On a more applied level, policy research could focus on the
conditions that lead staff to emphasize professional subgoals, and to
re-prioritize these subgoals to be more in line with the project’s
subgoals. The study suggests that policies with a somewhat limited set
of goals may help staff to focus their subgoals. Clearly, then,
attention must be devoted to how to develop and communicate policy
subgoals so that they are accurately perceived by staff.
The study also strongly suggests that where personal subgoals are
threatened, staff are unlikely to deliver services at a high level.
Are there ways of modifying policies, administrative procedures, and
employment conditions so that staff are less likely to perceive
threats to their security?
Policy analysts could examine the extent to which a policy may be
seen by local implementers as having either divergent or reinforcing subgoals. The study suggests that tension is created when staff
feel they are asked to deliver services that are perceived to have
conflicting requirements, such as maintaining academic standards while
providing employment to youths.
Tension does not necessarily mean that a policy will be ineffective
or that slippage will occur. Further research may be able to (1)
identify whether or not a given policy might be asking staff to behave
in ways that they might perceive as non-reinforcing to important
subgoals; (2) evaluate the negative and positive effects of the
possible resulting tensions; and (3) identify means of enhancing the
positive while limiting the negative impacts. Research might also help
to identify and create appropriate balance between open-ended or
broad policy goals -- that may provide little direction to
implementers and little focus to their sub goals -- and too narrow a
focus that does not permit implementers to shape the program to meet
perceived needs at the site, and for the specific clients for whom
services are provided.
3. Subgoals in Action
This study used a relatively static measure of subgoals. Although
data on subgoals were collected from interviews or observations that
spanned over a year, only one questionnaire was filled out for each
person. From a more open-ended analysis of the site data, however,
it seems clear that the subgoals of staff changed over time. Further
research could identify how and why this occurred. Another interesting
question would be the relative impact of subgoals, the environment and
other external factors on outputs.
One interesting research question to explore is how different would
project outputs be if staff from a low-slippage sites for
example, were placed at a high slippage site. While this would
probably not be practical as a real experiment, it might be possible
to develop a computer simulation. Many more variables and sites than
were used in this study would have to be utilized.
E. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
1. The Importance of Staff
From the viewpoint of the policy-maker, the most important
implications of this study center around the selection, orientation
and training of staff. Where policy-makers and administrators are
able to design policies and programs so that staff professional
subgoals are compatible with policy subgoals, slippage is likely to be
low. This is, of course, an extremely difficult task.
One method of achieving this might be to place, in awarding
projects, as much emphasis on the selection of staff as on the
selection of an organization or project director. At present, many
program officials insist on a “key personnel” provision in a
contract. Among “key personnel” are such persons as the principal
investigator in a research project or the high school principal in a
school-based program. Key personnel have to satisfy the funding agency
before an award can be made and cannot be changed without the express
agreement of the funding agency. The present study suggests that equal
attention should be given to recruitment of the staff members who will
actually deliver the services intended by the policy.
There would be some difficulties involved in acting on this
suggestion, two of which involve timing and local governmental
arrangements. Timing refers to the fact that calendars of federal
agencies and those of the implementing organizations are often Out of
phase. Not only does the federal fiscal year begin October 1, a month
or so after schools begin, but also federal agencies often fail to
make awards on schedule because of delays in appropriations or for
other reasons. Without assurances that an award is coming -- and when
-- social service agencies assign staff to other duties. If an award
comes through, staff must either be reassigned or new staff hired.
One way of dealing with the difficulties of timing would be an
extension of the concept of “forward funding” in which funds are
authorized for the beginning of the next school year. A second
possibility would be to build in a “planning period” between the
time of award and the time of implementation. The level of support
during this period, as well as its duration, could vary to meet local
and federal needs. During this period of time, the project director
could interview staff, and arrange, where necessary, for transfer of
staff from other positions at the end of a semester or other unit of
time.
The second problem involves the question of local governmental
arrangements, and is particularly evident in large centralized
systems, such as city school districts. The applicant organization may
be a particular school, but the fiscally responsible agent is the
district, which controls hiring and reassignment of staff. A project
director often has little control over the selection or retention of
staff. The “fiscal agent” -- the city school district, for example
-- can change staff on the basis of overall school district
enrollment.
One way of dealing with this problem would be to “buy up the
project.” The federal government might relax the condition of “supplement
not supplant” where federal funds must be used as add-ons to local
funds, particularly for experimental projects. The federal government
could say that it is willing to pay a certain sum of money to provide
services, and that it will pay the salaries in full of staff involved
in the project, but that the project director would have the right to
select and retain staff. This is particularly important for
experimental projects where there is some need to ensure that
conditions remain the same for the life of the project. However, it
appears unlikely that Congress would enact this type of legislation,
except for experimental programs such as Youthwork.
Once staff is selected, however, this study suggests that it is
important to provide reinforcement for professional subgoals. It makes
sense, therefore, not only to recruit staff members whose subgoals are
already consistent with those of the project, but to build into the
policy provisions for the continued support of those subgoals. Federal
policy-makers have little control over the motivation of
street-level bureaucrats, and even less reason to assume that they
will place the same emphasis on policy subgoals as does the
policy-maker, especially when the policy-maker is trying to bring
about change.
A variety of mechanisms are available at both the policy-making
and policy-administration levels to ensure that staff subgoals
become more congruent with project subgoals. Planning time before the
project begins --and before the clients are there to be served --
could strengthen the commitment of staff to a project and its goals.
This time could be used to help develop the shared understanding of
the projects goals that may be necessary, to train staff in particular
skills, and to help staff clarify their own goals. Inviting staff to meetings at the national or
regional levels, with expenses paid, could do much to help them
realize they are not alone. Encouraging project officers to visit when
things are going well and to share findings with other projects could
also help staff concentrate on professional subgoals, and not view
such visits as threats to the refunding of the project.
The study also suggests that the selection -- or training -- of
staff with compatible professional subgoals is not enough if the staff
is going to perceive that participation in the project threatens the
achievement of their personal subgoals.
Staff uncertainty is inherent in “soft-money” projects, and
some insecurity is probably unavoidable. If staff is paid with federal
funds, they may not be assured employment if and when funds are
terminated. For many Youthwork project staff members, this was a
reality. For some, it was difficult to concentrate on providing
services to unemployed youth when they were trying to find jobs for
themselves. Assuming that the federal government will continue to
provide some funds in the form of short-term projects, the question
becomes how to minimize staff insecurity under such conditions.
One option would be to fund multi-year projects. In addition to
giving staff some economic security, the longer time would also give
them a chance to learn how to achieve project service goals, and might
lead to greater congruence between project and staff subgoals.
In many cases, however, multi-year projects are neither feasible
nor desirable. The goal of the policy may simply be to provide
short- term services. Congress may also worry that the longer the
project is in place, the greater the chance recipients will come to
view it as an entitlement and resist any changes.
2. Community, Subgoals, and Policy
A second dimension of the importance of subgoal congruence involves
the interrelationships among the community, host organization and
project. A strong, pre-existing, community of support for a
project’s sub goals appears to be an important element in the
success of the project. Such support reinforces staff subgoals,
provides additional resources, and reduces drains on staff time.
Conversely, where such subgoal congruence does not exist among the
staff, community and the project -- or where they are at odds -- staff
members may be caught in subgoal conflicts; focus is blurred; energy
dissipated; and time and resources re-allocated from direct service
delivery to resolving conflicts and to acquiring needed resources.
In some ways, this creates a dilemma for federal policies aimed at
both providing services in the most efficient manner and bringing
about some change in local conditions. To maximize services, funds
should probably go to established communities or organizations which
have strong ties to support networks. This procedure, however, would
effectively eliminate new organizations and innovative approaches from
competition. Moreover, it might mean that communities or districts
most in need would not receive funds.
One way out of this dilemma would be to provide greater support to
the newer organizations or to communities that have no tradition of
ser vice in the desired area. This would involve not only more funds,
but also establishing a community of interests or networks where such
do not exist. Special technical support might also be required.
Finally,evaluations of projects implemented by new organizations might very
well differ from evaluations of efforts of established organizations.
The strengthening of the organizational capacity of the former might
be specifically considered an important policy output.
Short-term projects may have special liabilities where community
support is required. Even projects with long histories of community
support usually have to establish new ties or working relationships as
a result of the particular type of new funding. At two low-slippage
sites, staff professional subgoals changed to be more in line with the
community over the duration of the project. This process, even under
the most ideal circumstances, seems likely to take longer than may
generally be assumed in planning short-term projects.
Another liability of short-term projects may be that a message is
communicated to the community that the project is low priority. In
some high-slippage sites, in particular, community members dismissed
the project as just another brief federal program. Moreover, it is
optimistic to expect that a principal or other administrator is likely
to spend much of his or her time and effort establishing and promoting
a project whose demise is expected soon after birth.
3. Policy Design, Subgoals and Slippage
It is apparent that the street-level bureaucrats in this study
placed a greater emphasis on providing services than on conducting
research. The question of whether or not it is possible to run
“planned variation” experiments in social service agencies is one
that has received consider able, generally negative, attention. The
explanations for why it is difficult to maintain research conditions
in the field are numerous.
What this study suggests is that the subgoals of staff may be one
reason. This study suggests that it is highly unlikely that many
individuals would place equally high emphasis on both research and
service, even if such a combined focus was desired. The Youthwork
projects experienced considerable frustration in having to allocate
what they considered to be scarce resources of time, energy and money
to research.
Some implications for policy design are clear. First, combining
research and service is expensive. It seems to be unreasonable, and
per haps dysfunctional, to expect that staff, who are primarily
committed to serving clients, devote considerable effort to research.
It follows, then, that the federal government will have to allocate
extra funds specifically for research. For research purposes, it is
probably best to hire persons whose subgoals are compatible with
research.
Second, it might be possible to increase the commitment of social
service agency staff to the professional subgoals of research by
involving them in the planning of the research, and not just in the
often onerous task of data collection.
Policy-makers and administrators could learn from the tensions
street-level bureaucrats experience between and among subgoals, and
from the compromises they are forced to make in choosing what to
implement and at what level. Feedback from the street-level
bureaucrats is essential to the reality testing of a policy. A policy
can simply be wrong in its conceptualization. In this study, academic
credit for work experience, which was almost universally opposed by
staff, probably should never have been required. Sometimes, the policy
calls for too much or takes persons in conflicting directions.
Research vs. service is a case in point. Without adequate planning and
resources, and without seriousconsideration as to who should deliver services and who should do
research, slippage is probably inevitable. Finally, a policy can be
generally sound in concept and adequately focused, but wrong in a
given situation. Requiring a school to devote a substantial portion of
its staff resources to teaching delinquent, near-illiterate
teenagers to run a business may not be appropriate. Local staff are
often well equipped to help make appropriate functional decisions in
such situations, and to modify projects accordingly. The existence of
slippage in these cases may not be an indictment of the staff, but
rather a call for the policy-makers to map backwards to themselves
and re-examine the policies. At the very least, staff views should
be solicited as a reality testing before decisions are made on
continuing or changing a program.
4. Research Policy
Although not directly on the topic of slippage, subgoals, and
outputs, there are implications from this study for policies
concerning the sponsorship of research by federal agencies. This study
was based on the secondary analysis of qualitative data. This seems to
be a promising approach for increasing the usefulness of expensive
case- study research projects.
In making large awards to ethnographic researchers, the federal
government might require that they propose some method of sharing
original data with others. This could involve turning over field notes
to the government, although this might mean that the information was
available under the Freedom of Information Act. It might be more
appropriate for the principal investigator to keep the data, but to
encourage others to use it.
In any event, care will have to be taken to ensure the
confidentiality of persons interviewed. One method of doing this is
“blinding” all references to names in the field notes or
protocols. Another method might be to share only summary documents,
but this might destroy the ability of other researchers to get
original insights into the project.
F. FINAL OBSERVATIONS
In this preliminary exploration of the relationships between the
individually held subgoals of street-level bureaucrats and their
agencies’ social service outputs, perhaps the thing that comes
through most clearly is the importance of subgoal congruence. Subgoals
might be defined as individually held objectives to which are attached
different levels of importance. The person believes that he or she
should and can obtain these objectives. Subgoal congruence refers to
the degree of sameness in the level of importance that different
actors attach to the same subgoal. Congruence between staff subgoals
and project subgoals is central for an effective project. Moreover,
because of the influences exerted on staff subgoals, congruence
between project subgoals and those of the host organization, and
congruence between the subgoals of the community, the organization and
those of the project are also important.
Federal policy-makers seem unlikely to get more than they pay
for, and lucky if they get anywhere near as much as they want for the
money invested. In all probability, about the best they can reasonably
hope for is to minimize the slippage between what they are paying for
and what they get. This study suggests that one of the major
determinants of the size of the gap is the degree of congruence
between the subgoals of staff and that of the policy. It follows that
slippage could be reduced if greater consideration were given to such subgoal congruence in
the formulation and administration of a policy.
This conclusion, however tentative, may have implications for
explaining and potentially reducing slippage arising at all levels in
the policy-making and policy-implementing chain. This study was
limited to the subgoals of local staff members in ten youth employment
projects. It was found that, at this level, staff subgoals seem to
exert a strong influence on outputs. From evidence in related
research, there is strong reason to believe that subgoals may also be
influencing the decisions -- and therefore the outputs -- for example,
of Congressional staff who draft legislation, federal bureaucrats who
shape programs, and local principals and others who administer
projects. The lack of congruence between their subgoals and the
subgoals of the policy may contribute to slippage. This is, at least,
a fertile area for additional research.
One of the major areas that remains unexamined is the extent to
which the major subgoal findings reported here hold across the broad
range of federal social policies. For example, it may be that the
influence exerted on outputs by individual subgoals may be greater or
lesser in different types of programs and organizations. If this
should be true, the extent to which outputs are related to individual
subgoals may vary as well between organizations, since the degree of
“coupledness” seems to both permit and require individual
decision-making.
A second set of questions involves the precise nature of individual
subgoals, how they operate, and the conditions that influence them.
While it is clear that many of the areas considered in this study are
exploratory, the focus on individually held subgoals seems to offer a
worthwhile field for further study. To what extent further research may be useful in explaining the phenomenon and in prescribing
remedies remains to be seen.
Another interesting question raised by this study concerns the
nature and the appropriate definition of slippage. In this study, it
was defined as the differences between what a project promises and
what it delivers in terms of outputs. While this definition is
appropriate both for research and administrative considerations, it
does not take into account the unspecified goals of the project or the
provision of services not directly called for in the proposal. Under
certain circum stances, street-level bureaucrats may choose not to
deliver the services promised in the contract, but instead deliver
services that they perceive are needed by the clients. It would be
interesting to analyze the relationships between professional subgoals
and actual delivery of services, not just those specified in the
contract. “Mapping backwards” from these findings might provide
useful information to policy-makers are they revise and refine
policies and programs.
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